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Introduction
The increasing role of farmland as a provider of environmental amenities, in addition to its traditional role as a primary input of agricultural production, has long been recognized in developed countries. Rising living standards, population growth and added leisure all operate to increase the demand for environmental amenities, including agricultural landscape. At the same time, these processes also increase the demand for urban land. The balance between these competing trends underlies ruralurban land allocation. The public good nature of agricultural landscape renders land market allocations suboptimal -an argument often used to justify some of the agricultural support policies in developed countries [6, 29] .
In this article we analyze the role of agricultural landscape in rural-urban land allocation, allowing for the amenity value of farmland to vary across crops. For example, highly profitable cash crops grown in greenhouses typically elicit low landscape value while extensively cultivated field crops generate a more desirable landscape. This feature implies that, in addition to land allocation between farming and housing, environmental considerations should also affect land allocation within the agricultural sector (between crops) and this feature bears upon farm policies.
Investigating the effects of population and income growth processes, we find that, contrary to market outcomes, the socially optimal allocation may call for more farmland preservation under either process. Indeed, in our empirical study, social farmland allocation increases with population.
Our work is related to the large body of literature that deals with the positive external effects of agricultural landscape (see, e.g., [28, 30] ). Noticeable examples in the context of urban-rural land allocation include McConnell [26] , Lopez et al. [25] and Brunstad et al. [6] . Rural landscape values have been estimated in a number of countries, including Austria [17] , USA [4, 3, 19, 31] , Canada [5] and Israel [14] .
However, in these works, as in McConnell [26] and Lopez et al. [25] , the amenity value of farmland does not vary across crops. Drake [8] and Brunstad et al. [6] differentiate the amenity value between agricultural activities (they considered tilled land, pasture and woodland) but ignore the rural-urban land allocation issue. The present contribution analyzes rural-urban land allocation under heterogeneous amenity values of farmland across crops within a unified framework.
The next section describes the regional land economy. Section 3 characterizes the market and socially optimal land allocations. An empirical analysis applied to Northern Israel is presented in Section 4 and the final section concludes with a few policy remarks.
The regional land economy
The urban sector: The regional urban sector consists of N households, each deriving utility from the consumption of private goods and a public good in the form of environmental quality. The latter depends on a variety of factors, such as availability of parks and beaches, air and water pollution, and aesthetic landscape.
Here we concentrate on environmental benefits generated by agricultural landscape, allowing for heterogeneity with respect to different agricultural crops. Accordingly, the representative household's utility depends on the consumption of a composite private good z, housing land l H (ha) and environmental quality as represented by land allocation among J crop groups L j , j = 1,2,…,J, and a non-agricultural open space (e.g., parks), denoted L 0 , in the household's locality (region) of area M. We use boldface L to represent crop group areas, retaining the symbol L for individual crop areas. The use of crop groups is needed when households demand for agricultural landscape is the same for two or more crops.
The household's utility is assumed to be additively separable with respect to the private goods (z,l H ) and land allocation
Maximizing utility with respect to z and l H subject to the budget constraint 
Define the indirect utility
The willingness to pay (WTP) to preserve the landscape pattern
The conditional WTP to preserve crop group j area L j given land allocation for all
We shall use the conditional WTPs in the empirical analysis.
The agricultural sector: The agricultural sector in the region consists of N A identical farmers growing K crops. Let F k (x k ,l k ) represent crop k's production function for the representative farm, using land input l k and an m-dimensional vector of other inputs x k . Let l A denote farm size, so that total agricultural land in the region
the representative farmer chooses crop k's input vector x k , k = 1,2,…,K, in order to
, taking as given the crop prices p k , k = 1,2,…,K, and the vector of x prices p x . Necessary conditions for this problem are 
The agricultural output and input prices p x and p k , k = 1,2,…,K, are assumed exogenous to the region under study (and in particular to the individual farmers' decisions) and are therefore suppressed as arguments.
The representative farm's inverse derived demand for crop k's land is given by the value of marginal product (VMP) of land in crop k production π k ′(l k ). When F k (x,l) exhibits decreasing returns to scale (e.g., due to the fixed quantity of the farmer's own labor and managerial skills) and
decreasing and can be inverted to give the derived demand function π k ′ −1 (r). At a land rental rate r, the demand for crop k's land is π k ′ −1 (r) (or 0 if π k ′(0) ≤ r). The aggregate land allocation for crop k is L k = N A l k and the inverse derived demands for land can be
The regional inverse derived demand for agricultural land is obtained by
When land rental rate equals r, the K crops land demands are the L k values satisfying
and aggregate agricultural land demand is obtained from Π'(L/N A ) = r, provided
When F k (x,l), k = 1,2,…,K, exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS), the individual crop return-to-land functions π k (l k ) are linear and the land VMPs in crop k production, π k ′, k = 1,2,…,K, are constants, independent of the L k values. In the absence of additional constraints, the farmer will grow only the crop with the highest VMP (i.e., the crop with the highest π k ′). With additional constraints (e.g., marketing quotas), the crop with the highest VMP will be grown first until it hits its constraint, then the second highest value crop, and so on.
Agricultural-urban land allocation
Focusing attention on agricultural-urban land allocation, we take the nonagricultural open area L 0 (parks) as given. The total land available for allocation is
Since the crop groups are a priori defined, a crop land allocation
Condition (8) can therefore be specified in terms of the crop-group areas L j , j = 1,2,…,J as well.
Market allocation: Ignoring distributional aspects, the particular structure of land ownership in the economy is immaterial for welfare evaluation so long as it can support land market transactions. When land rental rate is the same for housing and for crop production, we obtain from (2) and (7),
Equations (8) and (9) provide K+1 relations to solve for the K+1 market allocations
The total agricultural area under market allocation is 
The socially optimal land allocation maximizes (10) subject to the feasibility constraint (8) . Defining the Lagrangean ] [
, the necessary conditions for optimum include:
and j k is the group index to which crop k belongs.
The K+1 relations (8) and (12) The regional demand for agricultural land is obtained as follows. Let
represent the social (farmers and households) inverse demand for L A . Let
be the social demand (households and farmers)
for the first hectare of agricultural land and define
let L k (r,y), k = 1,2,…,K, be the cropland allocations that solve (11b) with µ = r and
In view of (11b) and (13)
and using (12) we find that the social agricultural land allocation
(in (14) it is assumed that constraint (8) is binding so that
and the social cropland allocations are
. By construction,
Population and income effects:
We investigate the effects of population and income on the social agricultural land allocation 
is the representative household's marginal WTP for agricultural land. Differentiating with respect to N and rearranging gives
where
is the (representative household's) demand elasticity for urban land (recall that l H = L H /N). The denominator on the right-hand side of (16) The income effect on agricultural land allocation is similarly calculated to
We see that the sign of ) ( ' y L S A depends on the balance between the income effects of aggregate urban marginal WTP for the amenity (N∂wtp/∂y) and the income effect of the individual household's urban land demand (∂D H /∂y). As in the previous case, it is possible that the income effect on agricultural land will be positive for a large enough urban population.
It is straightforward to verify that both )
are always negative. Thus, land markets will decrease agricultural land allocation in response to either population or income growth, which may contradict the socially desirable outcome.
Application
The densely populated, northern half of Israel (the area above the thick line in the map - Figure 1 ) has been undergoing massive rural-to-urban land relocation, particularly near urban centers where the amenity value of open space in general and farmland in particular is large (Fleischer and Tsur, 2003) . Table 1 compares population densities in a number of counties. Figure 1 presents a map and table 2 gives cropland pattern for northern Israel. CRS production technology is assumed for each crop. Under CRS, the VMP of land for each crop is calculated as the return per hectare (revenue minus cost), excluding land rental cost ( Table 2 ). As discussed in Section 2, without exogenous constraints, farmers will grow only the highest value crop -flowers in the present case. But exogenous constraints, such as marketing quotas, restrict planting area.
Consequently, we let the actual planting areas represent these implicit restrictions and obtain the region's inverse derived demand for agricultural land depicted in Figure 2 . loosening up recently (Feitelson, 1999) . Rural land developers pay the ILA a fee determined by land appraisers based on existing plots sold in the market in the same location. We use these data as a proxy for prices of rural land designated for development.
Regarding the quantity variable in the urban land demand equation, we use the average housing area (ha) per household in each of the 34 regional councils of the northern half of Israel. Averaging the price data for each of the regional councils gives 34 price-quantity observations. Data are also available on various socieconomic characteristics of each regional council and an index that ranks them based on eight demographic, education and standard-of-leaving variables. Table 3 presents summary statistics of the urban demand data. * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively *** significant at 6% against the alternative that the parameter is nonnegative.
The coefficient of log l h is negative, as expected. Also expected are the positive estimate of the coefficient of rank and the negative estimate of the coefficient of distance (housing prices are higher in localities that have higher levels of socioeconomic characteristics and that are closer to metropolitan centers).
The urban land prices include infrastructure cost such as sewerage, roads, electricity and communication. To put them on a par with marginal values of farmland and landscape WTP, the infrastructure cost should be accounted for and the annual (rental) equivalent should be calculated. With r denoting the interest rate and ρ the part of the urban land price due to infrastructure cost, the rental rate of urban land net of the infrastructure costs is , which in view of (18) is given by , where α h =α h0 +α hd log(distance)+α hR log(Rank)+log(r (1−ρ) ).
We use the OLS estimate h βˆ = -0.712 (table 4) for β h , and calibrate α h so that the market allocation of urban land in the region under consideration is larger than the observed allocation. In doing so we account for existing administrative restrictions that mitigate land-markets operation [11, 22] . In particular we assume, based on Feitelson [11] , that the market allocation of urban land is about a third larger than the observed allocation of 4,100 ha and set it at 5,500 ha. The corresponding agricultural land market allocation is 9,990−5,500 = 4,490 ha, which falls over the irrigated field-crop area (see Figure 2) . We thus calibrate h α such that the urban land demand at L H =5,500 ha equals $268 per ha -the vlue of marginal product of land at irrigated field crop production (see Table 2 , giving h α = 3.78. We thus obtain the following inverse demand for urban land:
Market allocation: In Figure 3 , farmland is measured (on the horizontal axis) from left to right and urban land from right to left. The private (farmers') derived demand for farmland and the urban land demand (equation (19)) 
The annual bids for agricultural landscape were set between $2.5 and $55.
Based on the focus groups, a preliminary questionnaire was created and pre-tested in a pilot of 47 respondents, after which the final questionnaire was designed.
A face-to-face survey was conducted among a representative sample of the urban population (cities above 50,000 inhabitants) to obtain WTP for each landscape type. The sample was designed as follows: the relevant cities were divided into small (50,000 -100,000 inhabitants), medium (100,000 -200,000 inhabitants) and large (above 200,000 inhabitants). From each of the 4 large and 9 medium cities, a sample size proportional to the city's population was randomly drawn. Regarding the small cities, 9 were selected at random and a random sample was drawn from each.
Altogether, the sample contained 350 respondents.
Each respondent received pictures of the three landscape types and was confronted with the scenario under which the agricultural landscape would be developed (transformed into urban land). Preserving the agricultural landscape requires imposing a tax (at the bid level) and respondents were asked if they were willing to pay it. Those that answered "yes" were given a higher tax level (bid) and those that refused to pay were given a lower tax bid. This procedure was repeated for each of the three landscape types (crop groups). In this way, the upper and lower bounds for the WTP range of each respondent for each landscape type were set.
Finally, we need to obtain the landscape allocation between the three crop groups for each respondent's locality. To that end, we use land allocation data for 43
"natural" sub-regions, determined by Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (see Figure   1 ). For each of these sub-regions, data are available on population density (number of inhabitants per square kilometer) and cropland areas for the three crop groups. By identifying the sub-region of residence, we can associate these data with each respondent. Table 6 presents summary statistics of various socio-economic and demographic variables for the 43 sub-regions. 
where L ij is crop group j's land allocation in respondent i's locality (sub-region), 
Estimation: Our observations entail the conditional WTPs, specified in (21) 
where BL ij , B ij and BU ij represent, respectively, the lower bid, the initial bid and the upper bid of the double-bounded dichotomous-choice procedure, yy means a "yes" response to the initial bid and a "yes" response to the following (upper) bid, yn indicates a "yes" followed by "no" and so on. Assuming independence of the conditional WTPs across crop groups, the likelihood of the i'th respondent is given by
. The maximum likelihood estimates are presented in table 7. (12), the social allocation requires marginal WTP for field crops area, i.e., ∂wtp/∂L 2 , which, in view of (20) , is given by Social allocation: In Figure 4 , we add the marginal WTP for field crops, specified in equation (24) , to the private (farmers') demand and obtain the social demand for farmland. In doing so we exploit the CRS and the WTP pattern under Accounting for the amenity value of farmland reduces urban land allocation from 5,500 ha to 4,929 ha (a decrease of about 10 %) and increases farmland allocation by about 13 % --from 4,490 ha to 5,061 ha (see Table 8 ). Evaluating equation (20) at the parameter estimates, we can calculate the WTP for an average household at the market and social farmland allocation. Multiplying by the number of households in the region gives the aggregate WTPs of $3.478 million and $3.595 million for the market and social allocations, respectively (see Table 8 ). As shares of farming profits, these WTPs are 15.5 % and 16 % under the market and social allocations, respectively. Population effect: The above allocations are calculated at the current population level. At the prevailing growth rate (2.5%), Israel's population will double in less than 30 years. We thus repeat the calculations under regional population of 140,000 households. The land allocation results are reported in Table 8 and 33.5% of the farmers' profits. 
Concluding comments
Disappearing farmlands due to urban sprawls are commonplace in developed and densely populated regions. This is indeed the inevitable outcome of the invisiblehand's response to population and income pressures. We show that accounting for the amenity value of agricultural landscape mitigates these trends and may even reverse them -as happens in our empirical study. In our framework the optimal farmland allocation depends not only on the amenity value of agricultural landscape in general but also on its distribution across agricultural crops. Crop areas differ in their return to farming and in the amenity value they generate. The amenity value of farmland, thus, bears both on the overall rural-urban land allocation and on the allocation of farmland between the different crops. These observations should be considered in any agricultural policy intervention.
The failure of land markets to account for the amenity value of farmland can be addressed by a variety of policy interventions. Examples include strict regulation such as zoning [1] , market-based mechanisms such as rural tourism infrastructure aimed at internalizing the landscape externality [12] , and incentive-based approaches such as agricultural landscape subsidies [10] . If the current farm programs in developed countries are to be justified by this market failure, they should pay close attention to the heterogeneity of the amenity value of farmland across crops.
